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Precedent Revisited:
Carter v Canada (AG) and the
Contemporary Practice of Precedent
Debra Parkes
In addition to the important substantive
changes to Canadian law brought about
by Carter v Canada (AG), the decision is
significant for its consideration of the doctrine of stare decisis. This article examines
the circumstances under which Canadian
courts, including courts lower in the relevant
hierarchy, might be entitled to revisit otherwise binding, higher court precedents and to
depart from them. At least in constitutional
cases, the Carter trial decision affirms that
trial judges may reconsider rulings of higher
courts where a new legal issue is raised or
where there is a change in circumstances or
evidence that “fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate.” Following a review
of the recent Supreme Court of Canada case
law on stare decisis, including Carter, the
article turns to some critiques of the Court’s

*

*
1

En plus des modifications importantes à la
loi canadienne suscitées par l’arrêt Carter c
Canada (PG), ce jugement est important en
raison de son examen du principe du stare
decisis. Le présent article analyse les circonstances en vertu desquelles les tribunaux
canadiens, y compris les tribunaux moins
élevés dans la hiérarchie pertinente, pourraient réexaminer et s’écarter de précédents autrement obligatoires rendus par
les tribunaux supérieurs. Dans Carter, la
cour d’instance affirme que les juges de
première instance peuvent reconsidérer les
décisions provenant de tribunaux supérieurs
lorsqu’une nouvelle question de droit est
soulevée ou lorsqu’une modification de la
situation ou de la preuve « change radicalement la donne », du moins dans les affaires
constitutionnelles. À la suite de l’examen de
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newly articulated approach to revisiting
precedents in lower courts, and responds to
those critiques. The article also looks to the
recent case law in which courts largely reject attempts to reconsider precedents from
higher courts, revealing that the pull to follow precedent remains strong in Canadian
law.
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décisions récentes de la Cour suprême du
Canada concernant le principe du stare decisis, y compris l’arrêt Carter, cet article traite
de certaines critiques quant à l’approche de
la Cour en ce qui concerne la révision de
précédents par les tribunaux inférieurs, puis
répond à ces critiques. Cet article examine
également la jurisprudence récente dans
laquelle les tribunaux rejettent largement les
tentatives de réexamens de précédents provenant de tribunaux supérieurs, révélant de
ce fait que l’attrait de la règle du précédent
demeure élevé en droit canadien.
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INTRODUCTION
Carter v Canada (AG) (Carter SCC),1 is a case about life and death.
The stakes for litigants do not get higher. The claim was filed in April 2011
on behalf of Lee Carter and Hollis Johnson, a couple who had accompanied
Lee’s 89-year-old mother, Kay Carter, to Switzerland to have a physicianassisted death. Gloria Taylor, who was living with Amyotrophic Lateral
Sclerosis (ALS), was added as a plaintiff shortly thereafter.2 The plaintiffs
argued that the criminal offence of assisting suicide3 violated their rights
under Sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Charter).4 The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, rendered in March
2015 in the plaintiffs’ favour and declaring the offence invalid insofar as it
prohibited assistance to competent, consenting adults facing grievous, irremediable and intolerable medical conditions,5 has been called “historic
and far-reaching”6 in its impact. Other contributions to this special volume
examine that impact and the many meanings of Carter SCC across law and
society. This paper focuses its attention on the trial stage of the litigation,
examining the lawyerly question of whether the trial judge was entitled to
decide the case as she did, declaring the impugned law invalid, when confronted with a precedent of the Supreme Court of Canada upholding that

1

2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter SCC].

2

The Supreme Court of Canada also heard from 25 intervenors who took various
approaches to the issue (some strongly in favour of physician assisted death;
some strongly opposed), including disability rights groups, religious groups,
medical organizations, and many others.

3

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 241 provides: “[e]very one who (a) counsels a person to commit suicide, or (b) aids or abets a person to commit suicide,
whether suicide ensues or not, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.”

4

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(UK), 1982, c 11.

5

Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 4: “[w]e conclude that the prohibition on
physician-assisted dying is void insofar as it deprives a competent adult of such
assistance where (1) the person affected clearly consents to the termination
of life; and (2) the person has a grievous and irremediable medical condition
(including an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that
is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition.”

6

Tonda MacCharles, “Supreme Court Strikes Down Assisted Suicide Ban”, The
Toronto Star (6 February 2015).
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very same law in a Charter challenge twenty years earlier in Rodriguez v
British Columbia (AG) (Rodriguez).7
I intend two meanings for the term “revisiting” in the title of this paper.
First, the paper examines the circumstances under which Canadian courts,
particularly courts lower in the relevant hierarchy, might be entitled to revisit otherwise binding, higher court precedents and to depart from them.
In another sense, the paper revisits, in the light of the recent developments
in the case law, what I said about stare decisis, and particularly the vertical
convention of precedent, in my previous published work.8
As any first year law student can tell you, the doctrine of stare decisis
means, at least, that courts lower in the relevant hierarchy are bound to
apply the law as expounded by higher courts.9 Precedent was against Taylor
and Carter, but they prevailed at trial. Justice Smith held that she was not
bound by the decision in Rodriguez because the law and the legal analysis,
particularly with respect to Section 7 of the Charter,10 had changed significantly from Rodriguez. The social and legislative facts were also sufficiently different, as exemplified by a substantial body of evidence from
a number of jurisdictions that had decriminalized physician-assisted death
and had subsequently studied the effectiveness of various safeguards in
these jurisdictions to protect vulnerable community members from coercion
or pressure to end their lives.
While all of this was enough to convince Justice Smith to depart from
Rodriguez, a majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal did not share

7

[1993] 3 SCR 519 at 615, 82 BCLR (2d) 273.

8

Debra Parkes, “Precedent Unbound: Contemporary Approaches to Precedent
in Canada” (2007) 32 Man LJ 135. That article has been cited in a number of
cases, but it is, in some respects, dated because it was written before the recent
flurry of case law on the relationship between stare decisis and constitutional
supremacy discussed below.

9

See generally, ibid at 136. This is the vertical convention of precedent (that
courts lower in the hierarchy are bound by decisions of higher courts) whereas
the horizontal convention relates to the treatment by appellate courts of their
own decisions.

10

Section 7 of the Charter, supra note 4, provides that “[e]veryone has the right
to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”
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her view of the doctrine of stare decisis11 or its application to the case at bar.12
They overturned her decision, citing recent decisions of the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal13 and Federal Court of Appeal,14 as well as my 2007 article,15
for the proposition that “anticipatory overruling” of this kind is inappropriate in Canadian law.16 They held that the “the trial judge was bound to find
that the plaintiffs’ case had been authoritatively decided by Rodriguez.”17 In

11

Carter v Canada (AG), 2013 BCCA 435 at paras 54, 58–59, 365 DLR (4th) 351
[Carter BCCA].

12

Ibid at para 107

13

Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, 2013 SKCA 43 at paras
48–50, 361 DLR (4th) 132 [Saskatchewan Federation of Labour SKCA]. This
decision was later overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada: Saskatchewan
Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, [2015] 1 SCR 245 [Saskatchewan Federation of Labour SCC].

14

Air Canada Pilots’ Association v Kelly et al, 2012 FCA 209 at paras 47–48,
[2013] 1 FCR 308, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 10711 (28 March 2013)
[Kelly].

15

Carter BCCA, supra note 11 at para 316. It appears that I may have introduced
the language of “anticipatory overruling” into the Canadian case law, since a
search of all Canadian cases on both CanLII and Quicklaw/LexisNexis reveals
only two that contain the phrase: Saskatchewan Federation of Labour SKCA,
supra note 13 and Carter BCCA, supra note 11, both of which cited it in conjunction with my article. In the piece, I described anticipatory overruling as
occurring when a lower court is bound by a higher court precedent but refuses
to follow it when the lower court “is firmly of the view that the higher court
will overrule its own precedent when given the chance”: Parkes, supra note 8
at para 17. My discussion relied heavily on a case comment by Dale Gibson
in which he acknowledged the heretical nature of anticipatory overruling but
argued that it could be applied in clear cases. See Dale Gibson, “Stare Decisis
and the Action Per Quod Servitium Amisit – Refusing to Follow the Leader: R.
v Buchinsky” (1980) 13 CCLT 309. I stated that, given the relatively relaxed
approach to the horizontal convention of precedent evident in recent Canadian
appellate case law, “it might be argued that the case for anticipatory overruling
by intermediate courts is stronger than it might have been at the time Gibson
wrote his case comment in 1980. However, the reality is that there are very few
cases where it can truly be said that an overruling by the SCC is very likely or
inevitable (as opposed to the CA simply disagreeing with the precedent of the
SCC)”: Parkes, supra note 8 at para 22.

16

Carter BCCA, supra note 11 at para 316.

17

Ibid at para 324.
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such a situation, they maintained, the trial judge’s role is to “allow the parties to gather and present the evidence and to make the necessary findings of
fact and of credibility, so as to establish the evidentiary record upon which
the Supreme Court can decide whether to reconsider its earlier decision.”18
Justice of Appeals Finch dissented for reasons similar to those of Justice
Smith.
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the trial decision, confirming the
approach to the vertical convention of precedent that the Court had articulated in the intervening case of Canada (AG) v Bedford (Bedford).19 The
unanimous Court in Carter SCC said:
The doctrine that lower courts must follow the decisions of
higher courts is fundamental to our legal system. It provides
certainty while permitting orderly development of the law in
incremental steps. However, stare decisis is not a straitjacket
that condemns the law to stasis. Trial courts may reconsider
settled rulings of higher courts in two situations: (1) where a
new legal issue is raised; and (2) where there is a change in
the circumstances or evidence that “fundamentally shifts the
parameters of the debate.”20

The Court went on to apply this standard to Justice Smith’s decision, holding that “both conditions were met.”21 The Section 7 law was sufficiently
different from Rodriguez, presenting a “new legal issue” for the trial judge.
In addition, the evidence established new social and legislative facts that
fundamentally altered the parameters of the debate, undermining key foundations of Rodriguez, such as the premise that “a blanket prohibition” on
assisted suicide “is necessary to protect against the slippery slope” toward
vulnerable people being involuntarily euthanized.22
In a recent case comment on Carter SCC, Dwight Newman argues that
the Supreme Court of Canada has abandoned an established rule against an-

18

Ibid at para 316, citing Kelly, supra note 14 at para 48.

19

2013 SCC 72 at para 42, [2013] 3 SCR 1101 [Bedford].

20

Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 44 [footnotes omitted].

21

Ibid at para 45.

22

Ibid at para 47.
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ticipatory overruling without adequate explanation.23 He sees the Bedford/
Carter line of cases as displaying a “shockingly standardless approach to
precedent.”24 He also argues that the Supreme Court has essentially collapsed the two approaches to precedent (horizontal and vertical) into the
same analysis.
To examine the cogency of Newman’s critique and to gauge the scope
and impact of the Bedford/Carter SCC approach to the vertical convention, it is necessary to look more closely at the way that the judicial role
and process of judging is articulated in these decisions and to understand
the contours of the contemporary Canadian doctrine of stare decisis within
that context. Following a review of the recent Supreme Court of Canada
case law on stare decisis, attention will be turned to some critiques of the
approach to the vertical convention of precedent articulated in Bedford and
Carter SCC, and responses to those critiques. The final Part of the paper
looks to the future of the vertical convention, briefly examining a handful
of post-Bedford/Carter SCC lower court decisions to get a sense of how
the doctrine is being conceived of and applied. In short, the floodgates have
not opened; the vertical convention of precedent remains quite strict. The
paper concludes with some brief thoughts on the theory versus practice of
precedent.

I. The Practice of Precedent: Recent Supreme Court of Canada
Case Law
Recent cases before the Supreme Court of Canada have prompted the
Court to explicitly address stare decisis and both the vertical and horizontal conventions of precedent. Throughout its recent case law, the Court has
cited familiar rhetoric about the pursuit of “certainty” in the common law,
but has been more explicit about the extent to which it will abandon precedents (even relatively recent ones) in favour of correcting decisions now
thought to be wrong in the light of new evidence or doctrine.
What has been most significant in the last five years is the extent to
which the Court has revised the vertical convention of precedent, allowing
some limited room for lower courts to revisit otherwise binding precedents,

23

Dwight Newman, “Judicial Method and Three Gaps in the Supreme Court of
Canada’s Assisted Suicide Judgment in Carter” (2015) 78:2 Sask L Rev at 218.

24

Ibid at 219.
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at least in constitutional cases. To understand this trend, it is necessary to
read Bedford and Carter SCC together with the other key Supreme Court of
Canada decisions explicitly addressing stare decisis in the last decade or so.
This Part canvasses the decisions in roughly chronological order, drawing
attention to the, at times, differing accounts of stare decisis and the way that
the subject matter of the case may influence the practice of precedent. The
opinions of Justice Rothstein are an interesting study in this regard.
A word on terminology: my use of the term “practice of precedent”
arises from my view that precedent is best understood as a judicial practice
shaped by legal culture and a host of other factors rather than as a doctrine
or rule.25

A. R v Henry (2005)
I have previously traced the development of the functional and pragmatic approach of the Supreme Court of Canada and intermediate appellate
courts to the horizontal convention of precedent (their decisions to overrule their own precedents) in the early Charter era.26 R v Henry (Henry),27
decided in 2005, ten years before Carter SCC, is regularly cited in recent
cases for its articulation of the contemporary approach to stare decisis, particularly the horizontal convention.28 In Henry, the Court revisited two post-

25

See Adam Gearey, Wayne Morrison & Robert Jago, The Politics of the Common Law: Perspectives, Rights, Processes, Institutions (Abingdon: Routledge–
Cavendish, 2009) at 75–76:
[P]recedent is not to be understood as a rule or doctrine but as
judicial practice. That practice is shaped by, among other things,
the rules on court hierarchy, ideas as to the nature of case law
and the ‘law-making’ nature of judicial determination of disputes. Such ideas reflect general jurisprudential beliefs, even if
not so clearly articulated by the judge.

26

Parkes, supra note 8 at 149–58.

27

2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 SCR 609 [Henry].

28

I am grateful to Jula Hughes for reminding me of United States of America v
Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 SCR 283 [Burns], a decision in which the Supreme Court of Canada reconsidered the constitutionality of extraditing Canadians to face the death penalty in another country just 10 years after it had
upheld that practice under Charter review in Kindler v Canada (Minister of
Justice), [1991] 2 SCR 779, [1991] SCJ No 63. In Burns, a differently consti-
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Charter precedents, R v Kuldip (Kuldip)29 and R v Mannion (Mannion),30
interpreting the right against self-incrimination in Section 13 of the Charter,
which together created confusion and a lack of clarity in this area of the
law of evidence.31 In overruling aspects of those two precedents, the Court
articulated a clear rule that Section 13 protects against any compelled statements being used against a person in a subsequent proceeding,32 returning
to the stated purpose of Section 13 articulated 20 years earlier in Dubois.33
Any statements that were voluntarily given by the accused are not protected
by Section 13 (such as, in Henry, the accused’s testimony at his first trial).
The Court in Henry stated that it “should be particularly careful before
reversing a precedent where the effect is to diminish Charter protection.”34
In the result, it overruled one aspect of the case law that has been beneficial
to the accused (the rule from Mannion that an accused could not ordinarily
be cross-examined on prior voluntary testimony) and one aspect that had
been favourable to the Crown (the rule from Kuldip permitting cross-examination on all prior testimony, provided it was used to impeach credibility,
rather than to incriminate the accused).

tuted Court unanimously held that Section 7 of the Charter requires that the
Minister of Justice seek assurances that the death penalty will not be sought
before signing an extradition order, citing changes in the social science evidence about the practice of the death penalty, particularly in the United States.
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Burns did not overrule Kindler, opting instead to distinguish it. In fact, the words stare decisis and precedent do not
appear in the Burns opinion, yet the Court focuses on changes in the social and
legislative facts surrounding the death penalty. See Richard Haigh, “A Kindler,
Gentler Supreme Court? The Case of Burns and the Need for a Principled Approach to Overruling” (2001) 14 SCLR (2d) 139 at 157 (arguing that the Supreme Court lacks “a specialized theory to guide the overturning of previous
constitutional decisions”).
29

[1990] 3 SCR 618, 1 CR (4th) 285.

30

[1986] 2 SCR 272, 31 DLR (4th) 712.

31

See e.g. Gary Trotter, “R. v. Henry: Self-Incrimination and Self-Reflection in
the Supreme Court” (2006) 34 SCLR (2d) at 420, commenting on the preHenry state of the law: “Twenty years of experience with section 13 of the
Charter has given rise to inconsistency and dubious distinctions.”

32

Henry, supra note 27 at para 59.

33

Dubois v R, [1985] 2 SCR 350, 23 DLR (4th) 503.

34

Henry, supra note 27 at para 44.
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The relatively transparent, pragmatic approach taken by the Henry
Court to overruling its own precedents – admitting error or unworkability –
is preferable to an approach that distinguishes cases on technical grounds,
reinterprets them substantially without admitting a change, or continues to
apply a law thought to be unjust.35 The Court offered three “compelling reasons” for overruling its own precedents (the unworkability of former rules,
unfairness to the accused, and inconsistency with the purpose of the Charter
section), but generally seemed quite comfortable with its power to do so.

B. R v Nedelcu (2012)
Skipping ahead a few years, the precedent set in Henry, overruling key
aspects of the Court’s recent decisions in Mannion and Kuldip, was itself
revisited in the 2012 decision in R v Nedelcu.36 The Court’s willingness
to revisit Henry illustrates the diminished role that horizontal stare decisis
plays in the Charter era. The Supreme Court, and lower courts across the
country, are clearly wrestling with the many ways that the right against selfincrimination can be interpreted and applied, and the implications of those
different approaches for accused persons and the trial process. In Nedelcu,
the driver of a motorcycle was charged with impaired driving and dangerous
driving causing death after his co-worker died while riding as his passenger.
When the deceased’s family also brought a civil action, Nedelcu testified on
examination for discovery that he had no memory of the crash. At his subsequent criminal trial, Nedelcu provided a detailed account of the events.37
The legal issue for the Supreme Court was whether Nedelcu’s Section 13
Charter right prevented him from being cross-examined on his testimony
at the examination for discovery. Criminal lawyers saw Henry as offering
clarity and a workable rule (compelled evidence was protected and inadmissible; voluntary evidence was not protected and therefore, admissible), as
unpalatable as that may be in some cases.38 However, in Nedelcu, a majority
of the Supreme Court resurrected the approach from the earlier case law

35

Parkes, supra note 8 at 152.

36

2012 SCC 59, [2012] 3 SCR 311.

37

Ibid at paras 50–54.

38

See e.g. Megan Savard, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Supreme
Court’s Decision in Nedelcu” Addario Law Group (4 January 2013), online:
<www.addario.ca/one-step-forward-two-steps-back-the-supreme-courts-decis
ion-in-nedelcu/>.

2016

Precedent Revisited: Carter v Canada (AG) and the
Contemporary Practice of Precedent

S133

that had attempted, with great difficulty, to distinguish between incriminating and non-incriminating evidence. Nedelcu arguably returns us to lack of
clarity, since a renewed focus on incriminating versus non-incriminating
evidence as the threshold question creates considerable room for argument
about the use to which a prior statement of the accused can be put.39
In Nedelcu, the majority opinion framed the issue as an interpretation
question (what does “incriminating” mean in Section 13?) and purported
not to be overruling Henry. The dissenting judges were unconvinced, seeing
the new interpretation of incriminating versus non-incriminating evidence
as incompatible with the ruling in Henry. As such, Nedelcu is an example
of the Court overruling a precedent in an indirect way. It is preferable for
courts to be clear about their treatment of a precedent, reconsidering and
overruling (if necessary) in a transparent way. No doubt the facts in Nedelcu
– particularly the spectre of an undoubted liar being acquitted of a serious
crime through the exclusion of his earlier evidence – loomed large in the
decision to effectively overrule (or at least, substantially modify) Henry.

C. Ontario (AG) v Fraser (2011)
Just a few months before Nedelcu, in Ontario (AG) v Fraser (Fraser),40
the Court was similarly divided on this very issue of the approach it should
take to overruling (or not) its recent Charter precedents. Fraser is one in a
series of Charter cases dealing with the Court’s evolving interpretation of
Section 2(d) freedom of association in the context of labour law. It is an area
in which differing ideological approaches and views of the appropriate role
of government in regulating labour-management relations loom large. It is
also an area in which the courts have had to wrestle with the precedential
value of early Charter decisions.
In Fraser, the Court rejected a claim by agricultural workers that the
freedom of association protected in Section 2(d) of the Charter included a
right to form a union which, if recognized, would render unconstitutional
Ontario legislation setting out a regime for the legal protection of “agricul-

39

See Sara Hanson, “R v Nedelcu: The Right Against Self-Incrimination and
the Return to the Unworkable Distinction” (24 November 2012), theCourt.ca
(blog), online: <www.thecourt.ca/2012/11/24/r-v-nedelcu-the-right-againstself-incrimination-and-the-return-to-the-unworkable-distinction/>

40

2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3 [Fraser].
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tural workers’ associations”41 that did not include protection for collective
bargaining by these associations. The Court was faced with its own decision three years earlier in Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v British Columbia (British Columbia Health
Services)42 which had recognized a right to bargain collectively in Section
2(d), a decision which itself had revisited and overruled an earlier decision
to the contrary from 1990.43 As it would also do in Nedelcu, the majority
opinion chose to reinterpret (and indeed, limit) the scope of its recent ruling in British Columbia Health Services. In so doing, the majority rejected
the agricultural workers’ claim that the workers said flowed directly from
the British Columbia Health Services ruling. While the separate legislative
regime for agricultural workers’ associations was less favourable to workers than the Labour Relations Act, 199544 in many respects, including for
example, imposing no duty on employers to bargain with the workers’ associations, the majority held that the Section 2(d) right was not infringed.45
Justice Rothstein wrote a lengthy opinion, concurring in the result but
holding that it was necessary to overrule British Columbia Health Services
which, in his view, had wrongly expanded the scope of Section 2(d), tipping
the balance in favour of unions and workers. He framed his departure from
the majority as a disagreement about stare decisis, making various arguments in favour of overturning this very recent precedent, despite the fact
that none of the parties had asked the Court to do so. Reading Justice Rothstein’s dissent, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that his fundamental
difference with the majority was with respect to the correct interpretation
of the right itself, more particularly, how strongly labour rights should be
protected under the Charter and how much state regulation of the labour
market the Charter should require, not about principles of stare decisis. The
majority opinion upheld the three-year-old precedent of British Columbia
Health Services, which declared the right to bargain collectively to be pro-

41

Agricultural Employees Protection Act, SO 2002, c 16.

42

2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 [British Columbia Health Services].

43

Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v Northwest Territories
(Commissioner), [1990] 2 SCR 367, 72 DLR (4th) 1.

44

SO 1995, c 1, Schedule A.

45

Fraser, supra note 40 at paras 106–07. For extensive analysis and critique of
Fraser, and discussion of its impact on labour and constitutional law, see Fay
Faraday, Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, eds, Constitutional Labour Rights in Canada: Farm Workers and the Fraser Case (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012).
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tected by Section 2(d) of the Charter, whereas Justice Rothstein urged the
court to overturn this recent precedent in favour of the previous approach
(in the 1989 Labour Trilogy) which had denied such protection. As we will
see, a few years later, in another group of labour cases, Justice Rothstein
takes the same substantive position – that the Labour Trilogy carved out the
appropriate, limited role for Section 2(d) rights in the labour context – while
again differing from the majority on whether to overrule a precedent.

D. Canada v Craig (2012)
In Canada v Craig (Craig),46 decided just before Bedford, Justice Rothstein wrote an opinion for the Court which overruled its 35 year-old precedent-setting decision, Moldowan v Canada (Moldowan),47 on the interpretation of a section of the Income Tax Act limiting deductible losses from farm
income where farming was not the taxpayer’s primary source of income.48
Moldowan had been criticized in a 2006 decision of the Federal Court of
Appeal, Gunn v Canada (Gunn),49 and the trial judge in Craig had refused to
apply Moldawan for the reasons articulated in Gunn. Tax law scholars Neil
Brooks and Kim Brooks have extensively critiqued the decision in Craig,
and the Court’s willingness to overrule an established precedent that was
consistent with the government’s stated tax policy approach and that had
been applied regularly by the Canada Revenue Agency for decades.50 On
behalf of the Court, Justice Rothstein adopted what Brooks and Brooks describe as a “plain meaning” approach to the Income Tax Act, which they
argue is strikingly different from the Court’s contextual and purposive approach in other areas of statutory interpretation.51 Brooks and Brooks point
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2012 SCC 43, [2012] 2 SCR 489 [Craig].

47

[1978] 1 SCR 480, 77 DLR (3d) 112.
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RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), s 31(1) as it appeared on 1 August 2012. At the time
of Craig, supra note 46, the section provided that the loss a taxpayer could
claim from farming would be restricted “where a taxpayer’s chief source of
income for a taxation year is neither farming nor a combination of farming and
some other source of income.”
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2006 FCA 281, [2007] 3 FCR 57.
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“The Supreme Court’s 2012 Tax Cases: Formalism Trumps Pragmatism and
Good Sense” (2014) 64 SCLR (2d) 267.
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Ibid at 269–70.
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to Craig as an example of “the staggering failure of the Court’s formalism”
in tax cases.52 The horizontal stare decisis analysis in Craig consists of a
loose balancing test, citing the familiar language of balancing certainty and
correctness.53 At the same time, the Court’s analysis on this point arguably
tilts significantly in the direction of “correcting” what the Court sees as an
erroneous interpretation in Moldowan.
In overruling Moldowan, Justice Rothstein made clear his view that the
vertical convention of precedent was strict here: the trial judge should have
followed Moldawan, despite disagreeing with it and favouring the analysis
in Gunn. He said:
It may be that Gunn departed from Moldowan because of the
extensive criticism of Moldowan. Indeed, Dickson J. himself
acknowledged that the section was “an awkwardly worded
and intractable section and the source of much debate” (p.
482). Further, that provision had not come before the Supreme
Court for review in the three decades since Moldowan was
decided.
But regardless of the explanation, what the court in this case
ought to have done was to have written reasons as to why
Moldowan was problematic, in the way that the reasons in
Gunn did, rather than purporting to overrule it.54

In an interesting postscript, Parliament reacted swiftly to Craig by amending the Income Tax Act to return the law to the Moldawan interpretation
limiting farm loss deductions.55
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Ibid at 273.
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Craig, supra note 46 at para 27. The same language is used by Justice Rothstein in Fraser, supra note 40 at para 133.
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Ibid at paras 20–21.
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Income Tax Act, supra note 48, s 31(1) as it appeared on 12 December 2013. The
provision has since read that farming loss would be restricted “[if] a taxpayer’s
chief source of income for a taxation year is neither farming nor a combination
of farming and some other source of income that is a subordinate source of
income for the taxpayer.” See Canada Revenue Agency, Federal Budget Announcement, “Budget 2013 – Restricted Farm Losses” (15 July 2015), online:
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Plan 2013 Act, No 2, SC 2013, c 40, s 14.
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Brooks and Brooks argue that Justice Rothstein’s tax decisions continued a trend toward formalism found in the Court’s tax cases in the years
before his appointment. During his decade-long term, Justice Rothstein was
the top Court’s go-to judge in tax cases, writing a majority of the Court’s
decisions in that field. The stated commitment to finding the “plain meaning” of the tax statute, without an attempt to discern the policy purposes of
particular tax provisions, “allows the Court to escape responsibility for the
outcomes of its decisions. The results are thought to be preordained by the
words the drafters chose.”56 There are parallels between this approach and
appeals for a strict adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis in the sense that
both can justify formalism over attention to the social context and impact
of a decision. In Bedford, a changing social context loomed large, bringing
with it a somewhat revised approach to the vertical convention of precedent.

E. Canada (AG) v Bedford (2013)
Bedford is the watershed case, decided just a few months after Craig,
that explicitly reassessed the contours of the vertical convention of precedent in constitutional cases. All members of the Court, including Justice
Rothstein, signed on to this ground-breaking opinion striking down Canada’s prostitution laws. In Bedford, the precedent was the 1990 decision of
the Supreme Court in the Prostitution Reference,57 which had upheld the
prostitution-related offences in the Criminal Code in the face of arguments
that they violated Sections 2(b) and 7 of the Charter. The 1990 reference
opinion was framed around an economic liberty argument, as well as a commercial expression claim.58 More than twenty years later, in Bedford, the
legal arguments were substantially different. They focused on security of
the person interests and recently developed principles of fundamental justice (arbitrariness, gross disproportionality, and overbreadth) as opposed to

56

Brooks & Brooks, supra note 50 at 271.
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Reference Re Sections 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man), [1990]
1 SCR 1123, 49 Man R (2d) 1 [Prostitution Reference]. As Adam Dodek has
noted, references are, in practice, treated as binding authority in the same way
as conventional cases, despite their formal status as advisory opinions: Adam
Dodek, “Courting Constitutional Danger: Constitutional Conventions and the
Legacy of the Patriation Reference” (2011) 54 SCLR (2d) 117 at 129–30, citing Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell,
2007) (loose-leaf 2014 supplement) vol 1 at § 8.6(d).
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vagueness and indirect criminalization which were argued in the Prostitution Reference. Also new in Bedford was a body of social science evidence,
from which Justice Himel found new social and legislative facts, which
were materially different from those on which the Prostitution Reference
was decided.
Joseph Arvay, co-counsel to the plaintiffs in Carter, was also co-counsel to the intervenor, the David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights (Asper Centre), in Bedford. Stare decisis was the only issue on which the Asper
Centre intervened in Bedford and their submissions figured prominently in
the Court’s decision on this issue. The essence of the argument made – and
accepted by the court – was articulated in a 2012 law journal article penned
by Arvay and his Carter co-counsel, Sheila Tucker and Alison Latimer.59
They argued that “section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 effectively imposes a constitutional duty on a trial court to distinguish, where appropriate,
a prior Charter decision on the basis of a change in legislative and social
fact.”60 This approach to the vertical convention of precedent is rooted in
the doctrine of constitutional supremacy. Here are the key paragraphs from
Chief Justice McLachlin’s unanimous opinion in Bedford, approving of
these arguments and articulating a limited exception to the vertical convention:
In my view, a trial judge can consider and decide arguments
based on Charter provisions that were not raised in the earlier
case; this constitutes a new legal issue. Similarly, the matter
may be revisited if new legal issues are raised as a consequence of significant developments in the law, or if there is a
change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally
shifts the parameters of the debate.
The intervenor, the David Asper Centre for Constitutional
Rights, argues that the common law principle of stare decisis
is subordinate to the Constitution and cannot require a court to
uphold a law which is unconstitutional. It submits that lower
courts should not be limited to acting as “mere scribe[s]”, creating a record and findings without conducting a legal analysis

59

Joseph J Arvay, Sheila M Tucker & Alison M Latimer, “Stare Decisis and Constitutional Supremacy: Will Our Charter Past Become an Obstacle to Our Charter Future?” (2012) 58 SCLR (2d) 61.
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I agree. As the David Asper Centre also noted, however, a
lower court is not entitled to ignore binding precedent, and the
threshold for revisiting a matter is not an easy one to reach. In
my view, as discussed above, this threshold is met when a new
legal issue is raised, or if there is a significant change in the
circumstances or evidence. This balances the need for finality and stability with the recognition that when an appropriate
case arises for revisiting precedent, a lower court must be able
to perform its full role.61

The Court in Bedford went on to apply this new standard to the trial decision, holding that the judge was entitled to revisit the Section 7 issue given
the significant changes in the law and the very different basis of the Section
7 argument in the Prostitution Reference.62 These legal issues “were not
raised in the earlier case.”63 There was also a substantially different record
before the trial judge in Bedford, including significant evidence indicating
that the criminal prohibitions contributed to making sex work more dangerous, both with respect to the bawdy house and communicating offences.64 In
affirming the trial judge’s jurisdiction to consider the Section 7 issue anew,
the Supreme Court added that “the matter may be revisited if new legal
issues are raised as a consequence of significant developments in the law, or
if there is change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts
the parameters of the debate.”65 The Court went on to rule that the Section
2(b) analysis had not changed substantially and therefore it was binding
authority.
To be clear, the first way in which a lower court may revisit an earlier
precedent – where “new legal issues are raised as a consequence of significant developments in the law” – is not actually new; it is a grounded in

61

Bedford, supra note 19 at paras 42–44, per McLachlin CJC for the court [footnotes omitted].
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Ibid at para 45.
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Ibid at para 42.
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Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 at para 365, 327 DLR (4th) 52. Justice Himel stated, “[a]s a result of the voluminous evidentiary record put before
me in this case, I have found on a balance of probabilities that the impugned
provisions materially contribute to the decreased personal security of the applicants.”
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the longstanding notion that an earlier precedent is only binding for what it
actually decides. Of course, determining exactly what an earlier case stands
for is a significant and somewhat indeterminate part of the analysis that
leaves room for principled argument. The Supreme Court in Bedford held
that the Section 7 issue before the trial judge had not been decided in the
Prostitution Reference, whereas the Section 2(b) issue had.
What is truly new in Bedford is the statement by the Court that it is
open to a trial judge to reconsider otherwise binding precedents when they
are presented with a new body of evidence, particularly with respect to social and legislative facts, that “fundamentally shifts the parameters of the
debate.”66 In this respect, the ten pages of the Asper Centre’s intervener factum loomed large. They argued for a threshold requirement of a “significant
and material change” in the social and legislative facts for the revisiting of
a precedent on constitutional grounds.67 They argued that this threshold will
not open the floodgates: “[r]evisiting the few cases that meet [this threshold]
will not throw the system into disorder or disrepute, will not threaten the
rule of law and indeed will invigorate it by ensuring that citizens of ordinary
means can hold governments to the highest law at the earliest opportunity.”68
The unanimous Court agreed.

F. Carter v Canada (AG) (2015)
The new approach to the vertical convention of precedent was set out in
Bedford, applied (with only the briefest of mention) in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan,69 and then explicitly affirmed in Carter
SCC. By the time Carter reached the Supreme Court of Canada, most parties and interveners proceeded on that basis that the Bedford approach, permitting a limited revisiting of precedent by a trial judge, was now the law.
As for the horizontal convention, it seems to have been widely accepted
among the parties and interveners that it was time for the Court to revisit

66

There is no mention in Bedford about the potential difference between a reference and a conventional case in the sense of the more fulsome evidentiary
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Rodriguez in light of the new evidence and new Charter doctrine. That did
not mean that Rodriguez would necessarily be overruled, but few doubted
that the Supreme Court would take a good, hard look at it. The precedential
force of Rodriguez, an early Charter case, had been called into question.
Only the Attorney General of Ontario addressed the vertical stare decisis issue head-on, devoting its entire factum to this question and urging the
Court to affirm a very strict approach to the vertical convention. The factum
argues, “whether or not this Court now departs from its own prior decision
in Rodriguez, the British Columbia courts had no power to do so. None
of the factual or legal bases advanced by the trial judge justified the decision not to follow Rodriguez.”70 Ultimately, the unanimous Court in Carter
SCC disagreed, affirming the Bedford approach to the vertical convention,
at least in constitutional cases.
In an interesting move, the Ontario Attorney General attempted to flip
the argument underlying the Bedford approach to vertical stare decisis in
constitutional cases on its head, arguing that the doctrine of stare decisis is
itself an unwritten constitutional principle.71 The Ontario Attorney General
drew on the recent Reference Re Senate Reform72 in which the Court relied
on the constitution’s “internal architecture” and “basic constitutional structure” to effectively constitutionalize certain aspects of the composition of
the Supreme Court of Canada.73 The factum argued that “[v]ertical stare decisis is reflected, albeit implicitly, in the provision in section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 for ‘a General Court of Appeal for Canada’, the reference
in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 to ‘a Constitution similar in
Principle to that of the United Kingdom,’ and the preamble to the Charter,
which acknowledges that Canada is founded upon principles that recognize
the ‘rule of law.’”74
These submissions, elevating the goal of certainty and predictability in
the law to dizzying constitutional heights, received a very cool reception at
the Supreme Court of Canada. In its unanimous opinion, the Court rejected
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Carter SCC, supra note 1, Factum of the Intervener, Attorney General of Ontario at para 4 [Ontario AG factum in Carter SCC].
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the argument outright. They note that “Ontario goes so far as to argue that
‘vertical stare decisis’ is a constitutional principle that requires all lower
courts to rigidly follow this Court’s Charter precedents unless and until this
Court sets them aside.”75 In the next paragraph, the Court made it clear that
stare decisis is not a “judicial straightjacket” and went on to approve of, and
apply, the Bedford test for a lower court revisiting a precedent.
The Supreme Court of Canada does not engage the language of “anticipatory overruling” in Bedford or Carter SCC. It is clear that they do not
see this practice of revisiting precedent as overruling. The focus is not on
the likelihood of a higher court changing its mind but, rather, what exactly
is binding on the lower court due to changes in the law and/or evidence in
the intervening years. The newly articulated Bedford/Carter SCC approach
to the vertical convention is located in those decisions in proximity to the
established practice of distinguishing a precedent as not binding on a new
set of facts (here, new legislative and social facts) or as deciding a different
point of law. Constitutional supremacy is the “hook” on which the Court’s
approach to the vertical convention hangs. However, it is not clear in the
Court’s reasoning (or, indeed, in the subsequent cases) that the revised approach to the vertical convention should apply only in constitutional cases.
A substantial and material change in social and legislative facts may also
fundamentally change the parameters of an issue in, for example, family
law or tort law.
Beyond applying the new test to the facts of Carter and concluding that
it was clearly met by the changes in Section 7 doctrine and the very substantial changes in the social and legislative facts, the Court in Carter SCC
provided limited guidance to lower courts in deciding whether a change in
the law or evidence fundamentally changed the parameters of the debate.
It did not, for example, suggest factors to consider in deciding whether the
threshold for revisiting was met. In Bedford, the Asper Centre had suggested
the following non-exhaustive list to assist in determining whether a change
in social and legislative facts is significant and material: (1) the length of
time that has passed since the earlier decision; (2) the breadth of the new
evidence that was not available to the court in the earlier decision; (3) evidence that the social, political, or economic assumptions underlying the earlier decision are no longer valid; (4) evidence of a shift internationally in
approaching the problem; (5) any difference in adjudicative facts between

75
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the two cases; and (6) and difference in the perspective of the claimants in
the two cases.76
In Carter SCC, the Court clearly affirmed the Bedford approach to
lower courts revisiting (constitutional) precedents of higher courts. It is significant for its pointed rejection of the Ontario Attorney General’s attempts
to shore up the vertical convention as strictly binding. Outside the constitutional context, Craig suggests that the vertical convention remains strict.
However, it is not entirely clear that the reasoning in Bedford (and later
Carter SCC) does or should only apply to constitutional cases.
G. The new labour trilogy: United Food and Commercial Workers,
Local 503 v Wal-Mart (2014), Mounted Police Association of
Canada v Canada (AG) (2015), and Saskatchewan Federation of
Labour v Saskatchewan (2015)
During the approximately year and a half between Bedford and Carter
SCC the Supreme Court decided three contentious cases about labour rights,
all of which involved the Court revisiting its earlier precedents and addressing issues of stare decisis: United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 503
v Wal-Mart Canada Corp (Wal-Mart) (allowing unionized Wal-Mart workers to use a particular provision of the Québec Labour Code to challenge
the store closure following certification);77 Mounted Police Association of
Canada v Canada (AG) (Mounted Police) (holding that the right to bargain
collectively requires that workplace associations be structurally independent from the employer);78 and Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (holding
that Section 2(d) protects a right to strike).79 The latter case involved both
the vertical and the horizontal convention; whereas the other two cases were
solely about the horizontal convention.
In finding a constitutionally protected right to strike in Section 2(d),
thereby overruling the Court’s decision in the 1987 Alberta Reference,80 the
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majority opinion in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, penned by Justice
Abella, dealt with the stare decisis issue in one sentence:
Given the fundamental shift in the scope of s. 2(d) since the
Alberta Reference was decided, the trial judge was entitled to
depart from precedent and consider the issue in accordance
with this Court’s revitalized interpretation of s. 2(d): Canada
(Attorney General) v. Bedford.81

However, the dissenting justices addressed it at length, asserting that the
majority was running roughshod over principles of stare decisis. Justice
Rothstein co-wrote the dissent which echoed and expanded upon his dissenting opinions in Wal-Mart and Mounted Police.
In Wal-Mart, the majority opinion held that section 59 of the Québec
Labour Code, which bars the employer from changing conditions of employment during the period of negotiating a collective agreement, applied
to the situation at bar, in which Wal-Mart had dismissed all employees
and closed the business before a first contract could be negotiated. In their
dissent, Justices Rothstein and Wagner said that the majority’s “approach
undermines the principle of stare decisis, whose importance this Court so
recently emphasized in Canada v Craig.”82 They took the view that an earlier case, Plourde v Wal-Mart Canada Corp (Plourde),83 dealing with this
very store closure but relying on a different section of the Labour Code,
foreclosed the approach taken by the majority.84 However, section 59 was
not before the Court in Plourde and the majority held that it was open to the
arbitrator to apply that section as she had in this case.85 Justice Rothstein’s
approach to stare decisis in Wal-Mart is a decidedly strict one.
In Mounted Police, a majority of the Court held that Section 2(d), guaranteeing freedom of association, which since British Columbia Health Services has included a right to bargain collectively, entails a level of independence, and choice of bargaining unit and representative to be effective. In
so holding, the majority overruled its 1999 decision in Delisle v Canada
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(Deputy AG),86 which had found no right to bargain collectively for Royal
Canadian Mounted Police officers. Justice Rothstein, in a lone dissent in
Mounted Police, framed his substantive disagreement with the majority in
the language of stare decisis and certainty. He disagreed that the “structural
independence” of workplace associations (unions) was a requirement of the
right to bargain collectively, arguing that the majority approach “constitutionalizes an adversarial model of labour relations and effectively excludes
collaborative models.”87
Justice Rothstein sees this as an expansion of associational rights and as
effectively reversing a key holding of British Columbia Health Services and
Fraser, namely that Section 2(d) does not guarantee a particular model of
collective bargaining nor a particular outcome of that process. He goes on to
cite Bedford for the importance of certainty in the law. He says:
It is open to this Court to depart from its previous jurisprudence in some circumstances, but the importance and value of
certainty demand that such departures be made infrequently
and only where they have been carefully and explicitly considered to ensure that the departure is justified and that the
implications of such a deviation from the normal rule of stare
decisis have been fully and carefully analyzed. The majority
has failed to do so and its departure from authoritative precedents does not satisfy this high standard.88

In the Supreme Court’s most recent decision to address stare decisis, Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, a majority of the Court considered Bedford and Carter to have clearly established that it was open to the trial judge
to revisit the 1989 Alberta Reference which had held that there was no right
to strike protected by Section 2(d) of the Charter. The interpretation of Section 2(d) on which that decision was based – namely an “individual analogy”
approach to Section 2(d) which had limited its application to activities done
in a group that could be lawfully done individually – had been rejected
in a series of decisions beginning with Dunmore in 2002, through British
Columbia Health Services in 2007, Fraser in 2011, and Mounted Police in
2014. Arguably, there is no other Charter right that has gone through such
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a profound transformation as has the freedom of association.89 As Justice
Abella notes for the majority in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, there
has been a “fundamental shift” in the interpretation of Section 2(d). The
majority opinion in Mounted Police, penned by Chief Justice McLachlin
and Justice Lebel had already described the shift as follows:
The jurisprudence on freedom of association under s. 2 (d) of
the Charter. . . falls into two broad periods. The first period
is marked by a restrictive approach to freedom of association.
The second period gradually adopts a generous and purposive
approach to the guarantee.90

They go on to say that this “generous and purposive approach”91 seeks to
protect “employee autonomy against the superior power of management”92
to facilitate a meaningful process of collective bargaining. Justices Rothstein and Wagner dissent, disagreeing fundamentally with this shift and
again framing their disagreement in relation to principles of stare decisis.
Recall that previously, in Fraser,93 Justice Rothstein wrote a separate opinion from the majority, urging the Court to overturn its very recent
precedent, British Columbia Health Services,94 which had established that
Section 2(d) of the Charter protects a right of workers to bargain collectively.95 Justice Rothstein also signed onto the unanimous majority opinions

89

See generally Judy Fudge, “Freedom of Association” in Errol Mendes & Stéphane Beaulac, eds, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 5th ed (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis, 2013) 527 (chronicling, as the author puts it at 528,
“[t]he deep jurisprudential divisions amongst members of the Supreme Court
of Canada over the interpretation of freedom of association in the labour relations context.”). For a thoughtful discussion of Justice LeBel’s contribution
to these significant jurisprudential changes, see Jula Hughes, “Like Oil on
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Justice Louis LeBel” (2015) 70 SCLR (2d) 221.
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in Bedford and Carter SCC, which explicitly take a more flexible approach
to the vertical and horizontal conventions of stare decisis. His lengthy dissenting opinion in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour takes issue with the
majority’s reasons for overruling the Alberta Reference, articulating again
his deferential approach to judicial review in the labour relations context. If
anything, there had been more judicial activity directly undermining the authority of the precedent at issue in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour than
there was in either Bedford or Carter SCC. It is clear from Justice Rothstein’s opinions in the intervening cases (Mounted Police and Wal-Mart)
that he disagreed in substance with the majority opinion expanding workers’
rights. This is fundamentally a substantive, ideological disagreement, not a
methodological one, particularly given Justice Rothstein’s agreement with
the stare decisis analysis in Bedford and Carter SCC, but not with the majority in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour.
Tracing the Supreme Court of Canada’s contemporary approach to stare
decisis doctrine through Justice Rothstein’s recent opinions tells us something about the malleability of the doctrine and the extent to which disputes
about its operation are often fundamentally disputes about the merits of the
substantive issues before the court. I do not point out these various appeals
to, or descriptions of, stare decisis in Justice Rothstein’s rulings to single
him out for criticism. Rather, I suggest that they illustrate the reality that
stare decisis – and its alleged capacity to achieve certainty in the law – is
simply one of the “working ingredients” of judicial decision-making.96 In
all the cases, it was Justice Rothstein’s sense of justice, his view of the
“correct” legal answer, that animated his decisions, rather than a particular
approach to the doctrine of precedent. The extent to which he was prepared
to depart from precedent or defend it depended on the substance of the precedent and, with respect, whether he agreed with it or not. Substantively,
his labour opinions are all linked. Justice Rothstein’s position with respect
to a restrained role for the state in regulating the labour market is consistent
across all of these cases.
A basic insight of legal realism is that judicial decisions are influenced
by extra-legal considerations, including the experiences and beliefs of judges.97 As I read the cases, Justice Rothstein’s approach to stare decisis is

96

Parkes, supra note 8 at 161, citing Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A
Treatise, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2001) at 12.
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not fundamentally different or more (or less) principled than that of other
members of the Court. His substantive disagreement with Justice Abella’s
majority opinion in Saskatcehwan Federation of Labour is about the government’s role in regulating labour relations. However, it is framed as a different approach to stare decisis.

II. Evaluating the Contemporary Judicial Practice of Precedent
Critics of the Supreme Court’s contemporary approach to precedent,
and particularly the new Bedford/Carter SCC approach to the vertical convention, cite both principled and practical concerns. The principled concern
is that voiced by Newman that the approach to precedent is “shockingly
standardless” and the practical concern can be seen in the Attorney General of Ontario’s factum in Carter SCC, citing the need for a strict vertical convention to prevent a deluge of claims seeking to revisit settled law.
Similarly, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bedford raised the spectre of the
“living tree” doctrine of progressive constitutionalism being replaced with a
“garden of annuals to be regularly uprooted.”98
With respect to the objection based on a lack of standards and consistent
judicial method, I have discussed above the extent to which particular justices’ stated doctrinal approach to stare decisis, and its application in a particular case, is very much influenced by the subject matter of the case and the
judges’ own views about the correctness of the precedent. The stated goal of
achieving certainty in the law through stare decisis thus promises too much.
Justices Rothstein and Wagner open their dissent in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour with these words: “In our legal system, certainty in the
law is achieved through the application of precedents”99 and that the judge’s
task is one of “balanc[ing] certainty against correctness.”100 In fact, throughout the case law and commentary on stare decisis, it is repeatedly stated
that the doctrine balances the core principles of certainty and correctness.
While this is an appealing formulation, the language of certainty promises
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too much and is at odds with what judges actually do. Edmund Thomas,101
a former justice of the New Zealand High Court, has argued that calls for
strict adherence to precedent can actually undermine the elusive goal of
certainty, noting that the doctrine can be manipulated politically102 and can
compel courts “to distinguish on inadequate grounds decisions of which
they disapprove.” He suggests a more pragmatic approach to judicial decision-making that sees certainty as a relevant consideration, rather than as a
primary goal of adjudication. He says this of certainty:
Those who pursue certainty as if it were a general, abstract
goal of judicial adjudication do the law a disservice. Assume
for a moment that complete certainty was achieved, individual
justice would be sacrificed and, because it would be static, the
law would cease to serve the needs and expectations of the
community. The law would forfeit the concept of justice and
abandon its social utility. Certainty is not therefore an ideal, as
justice is an ideal. Nor is it a justification, as social utility is
a justification. Rather, it is a concept designed to serve these
ends. Its rationale lies in its ability to promote justice and to
serve the needs and expectations of the community.103

It is clear that we have seen a difference in the articulated approach to stare
decisis in recent years, a new orthodoxy. There is arguably a greater, more
explicit emphasis on correctness over certainty. This is welcome, particularly in the Charter era. An openness to revisiting early decisions is consistent
with the rate of social change in the Charter era (think of changing attitudes
toward same-sex relationships and marriage, for example). The fact that appellate judges may be more explicit about their interest in getting it “right”
is commendable. Our appellate process contemplates, and indeed relies on,
multiple minds being turned to challenging interpretive questions.104
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Similarly, the practical floodgates objection is not warranted.105 As
further discussed below, since Bedford, parties in a handful of cases have
attempted to revisit Charter precedents with little success. The spectre of
lower courts refusing to follow precedents “every time a litigant came upon
new evidence or a fresh perspective from which to view the problem”106
has not materialized. This is not surprising. The practice of following
precedent is deeply entrenched in Canadian common law culture and
courts are fundamentally conservative institutions. The barriers to bringing Charter claims are many, as evidenced by the recent treatment of a
Charter challenge, Tanudjaja v Canada (AG) (Tanudjaja),107 to provincial and federal action (and inaction) that the claimants argued exacerbated homelessness and inadequate housing in violation of Sections 7
and 15. The claim in Tanudjaja was struck out at the pleadings stage and
that decision was upheld by a majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal,
with the Supreme Court of Canada recently denying leave to appeal.108
While the approach to the vertical convention in Bedford and Carter
SCC is a positive move for access to justice,109 the difficulties litigants face
in seeking constitutional justice in the courts remain immense. The Supreme
Court has demonstrated some awareness of this problem as, for example,
access to justice issues figured prominently in the 2014 decision of the
Supreme Court in Canada (AG) v Confédération des syndicats nationaux
(Confédération 2014).110 In that case, Justices LeBel and Wagner wrote for
the Court that the jurisdiction to strike an action on the basis of stare decisis
should be exercised sparingly so as not to defeat access to justice:
Although the proper administration of justice requires that
courts’ resources not be expended on actions that are bound to
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fail, the cardinal principle of access to justice requires that
the power be used sparingly, where it is clear that an action
has no reasonable chance of success.111

In Confédération 2014, the unanimous Supreme Court held that the
unions’ claim was bound to fail; it had no reasonable chance of success
given the decision of the Court involving the same parties, decided four
years earlier.112
Recently, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal had occasion to consider
Confédération 2014 at length. In Andrews v Canada (AG),113 a majority of
the Court allowed a claim to proceed in the face of a challenge that stare
decisis and an earlier decision of that Court had rendered it “bound to
fail” as in Confédération 2014: “the policy of husbanding scarce resources for true matters of dispute may have to give way in some cases to the
importance of providing access to justice to enable advocacy of change
in and refinement of the law.”114 The majority applied the Bedford test for
revisiting a legal issue to modify the test for striking out a claim, holding
that “a litigant may have a ‘reasonable chance of success’ within the test
if based on reasonable argument there is a reasonable possibility that the
law might change.”115
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III. The Future of the Vertical Convention?
A number of cases have addressed the vertical convention of precedent
explicitly in the year and a half that has passed since the Supreme Court of
Canada released its decision in Carter, setting out the parameters for revisiting a higher court precedent in the light of changed law or evidence. Have
the floodgates opened to regularly revisiting settled precedents in the lower
courts? In a word, no. Courts have continued to apply precedents every
day and, even when faced with an opportunity to revisit, they have often
rebuffed that approach. The appeal of stare decisis remains strong in the
Canadian common law world.
How are courts interpreting and applying the Bedford/Carter SCC test?
That test provides that “[t]rial courts may reconsider settled rulings of higher courts in two situations: (1) where a new legal issue is raised; and (2)
where there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that ‘fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate.’”116 A common refrain in decisions
where the application to revisit a higher court precedent has been rejected,
is the statement from the Court in Bedford that “a lower court is not entitled
to ignore binding precedent, and the threshold for revisiting a matter is not
an easy one to reach.”117
One such case is R v Hersi,118 in which a trial judge rejected the accused’s challenge of the constitutionality of section 577 of the Criminal
Code, which authorizes direct indictment. The constitutionality of this provision had previously been upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v
Arviv119 and R v Ertel,120 as well as by the Supreme Court of Canada in
R v SJL.121 The trial judge acknowledged the new approach articulated in
Bedford, suggesting it was “akin to the pronouncement of Professor Roscoe
Pound more than ninety years ago” that “law must be stable and yet it can-
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not stand still.”122 However, the judge found no new legal issues or evidence, easily rejecting the argument for revisiting the earlier cases.
Similarly, in United States of America v Fraser (USA v Fraser),123 a
judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court presiding in an extradition
matter saw no basis for reconsidering the twenty-year-old Supreme Court
of Canada precedent in United States of America v Lépine124 which had been
codified in the form of section 5 of the Extradition Act to authorize extradition “whether or not the conduct on which the extradition partner bases its
request occurred in the territory over which it has jurisdiction; and whether or not Canada could exercise jurisdiction in similar circumstances.”125
Lépine held that the extradition judge should not consider the question of
the requesting state’s jurisdiction to prosecute the offence in question since
that matter was within the exclusive domain of the Minister.126 The judge
in USA v Fraser was not persuaded by the applicants’ argument that an
intervening case, United States of America v Ferras,127 had introduced a
new legal issue that met the Bedford standard for reconsideration.128 In USA
v Fraser, the judge rejected the characterization of the new issue as “the articulation that meaningful judicial process [in extradition matters] is a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter,”129 saying that
the only new aspect raised in Ferras was the approach to admissibility and
sufficiency of evidence by extradition judges, a very different issue from the
one being challenged by the applicants. Ferras was “not a broad overhaul of
the law of extradition,”130 and, as such, Bedford did not authorize a revisiting. To hold that Ferras reopened the question decided by Lépine would,
according to the court in USA v Fraser, potentially call into question all of
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the Supreme Court’s many decisions bearing on the limited jurisdiction of
extradition judges. “The values of certainty and stability that underlie the
principle of stare decisis strongly militate against that result.”131
In R v Junek,132 a judge of the Alberta Provincial Court rejected Junek’s
claim that his Section 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when he
was not told that if he had a cellular phone with access to the internet he
had the right to use the phone to access the internet as part of his exercise of
those rights. The same judge had made such a finding in a previous decision,
R v Welty.133 However, the very next day, a justice of the Queen’s Bench
ruled in R v McKay134 that there is no implementational duty on the police
to provide internet access to detainees who may wish to exercise their Section 10(b) rights to contact legal counsel (although he suggested that police
practice would likely change in the future in this regard) and therefore the
informational duty was not expanded to require the police to tell detainees
about their rights to access the internet to contact legal counsel. The judge in
Junek concluded that the Bedford standard was not met. There was no new
legal issue or new facts or evidence that significantly altered the parameters
of the debate. He was bound to follow McKay.
In another reported case, R v Wagner,135 an individual charged with
breach of probation and mischief to property in relation to her actions in
protesting at an abortion clinic. She attempted to raise a number of defences
– defence of the person, necessity, etc. – which had been rejected in earlier
case law. The question of whether a foetus was a human being was also
settled law. The Ontario Superior Court found no basis for invoking the
Bedford rule concerning the vertical convention of precedent. The judge
held that “the proposed evidence filed on Ms. Wagner’s part falls far, far
short of, ‘fundamentally [shifting] the parameters of the debate,’ and there
was no demonstration of any new legal issue.”136
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In R v Caron,137 the Alberta Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed a
claim that there was a constitutional obligation for all Alberta legislation
to be published in both French and English. Members of the francophone
community in Alberta had successfully argued in provincial court that the
provisions of the Traffic Safety Act138 under which they were charged were
invalid because Alberta was constitutionally required to publish its legislation in both English and French. They were successful in the Provincial
Court but lost in the Queen’s Bench and Court of Appeal. A majority of the
Court of Appeal considered the claim on its merits while one member of
the Court wrote lengthy concurring reasons holding that a 1988 decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Mercure,139 was binding authority
for the proposition that there was no constitutional requirement for English
and French publication that came with Saskatchewan and Alberta’s joining
confederation. Concurring in the result, Justice Slatter delved deeply into
the stare decisis issue, opining that “stability and predictability are particularly important” in the context of the “controversial and divisive” matter of
constitutional language rights.140 He held that the Bedford standard of “new
legal issues raised as a consequence of significant developments in the law”
was not met141 and therefore, the trial judge should not have revisited it.142
Similarly, he was unconvinced that the more substantial historical record
constituted new “evidence that fundamentally shifts that parameters of the
debate.”143 Interestingly, in the Court of Appeal the Crown did not rely on
the stare decisis argument, focusing instead on the substance of the constitutional arguments.144 The stare decisis opinion was a minority one in Mercure
but it taps into a more traditional, formalist view of stare decisis, stating that
the Bedford approach “embraces to some degree the controversial doctrine
of lower courts ‘underruling’ decisions of higher courts.”145
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Again in R v Caswell,146 the Alberta Court of Appeal is the site of a
significant debate about stare decisis. Justice Veldhuis, in dissent, held that
Court of Appeal should reconsider its 20-year-old precedent, R v Mitchell,147
which had upheld under Section 1 the suspension of Section 10(b) rights at
the roadside for sobriety tests and the use of an approved screening device.
Since Mitchell followed the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Thomsen,148 the vertical convention of precedent was also implicated in this decision. In concluding that it was appropriate to reconsider
Mitchell, Justice Veldhuis cited the Bedford language of changes in the law
and circumstance that “fundamentally shif[t] the paramaters of the debate,”
noting changes in technology (particularly cell phone technology) and in
the legislative scheme (including immediate roadside suspensions).149 However, the majority did not agree and their opinion expresses concern about
the approach to the vertical convention taken in Bedford. Justice Brown
states, “[t]here is little doubt that … Bedford represents a significant new
exception to stare decisis”150 and describes the Bedford threshold as “highly
abstract – particularly when compared to the test for invoking the per incuriam exception.”151 Justice Brown, who has subsequently been appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada, articulates the view in Caswell that
Bedford has not provided a “coherent and consistent normative account” of
when a precedent can be revisited and that, therefore, “the best lower courts
can do is take Bedford’s stated threshold seriously by applying it strictly.”152
He goes on to do so, finding that changes in technology and the legislative
scheme did not meet that high standard. It will be interesting to see how Justice Brown approaches stare decisis questions at the Supreme Court, given
his criticism of the Bedford standard in Caswell.
In R v Fitts,153 Justice David Pacciocco of the Ontario Court of Justice
ruled on a defence application for disclosure of certain information about
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the breathalyzer instrument used to obtain an alcohol breath sample relied
on by the Crown. Justice Pacciocco was faced with evidence that cast doubt
on the assumption inherent in a Supreme Court of Canada precedent, R v
St-Onge Lamoureux,154 in which it was held that improper maintenance and
historical difficulties with a breathalyzer machine can raise a reasonable
doubt about the validity of individual test results. However, he held that
he was nevertheless bound to follow St-Onge Lamoureux. Citing Bedford,
Carter and other cases, Justice Pacciocco stated,
I am uncertain whether there is a change in the circumstances
or evidence that “fundamentally shifts the parameters of the
debate.” I can have no confidence that the Supreme Court of
Canada did not have evidence before it similar to that which
has been presented before me, and that it did not reject the
arguments before it that I accept here. Nor can I be confident
that the evidence that I heard is complete.155

In none of these cases did the judge find the Bedford/Carter SCC threshold
for revisiting a precedent to be met. At least one expressed concern about
a lack of guidance provided to the lower courts in applying this new approach to precedent.156 Obviously, these are early days and it may be that we
will see more judges applying the Bedford/Carter SCC standard to revisit
precedents in the future. However, it is unsurprising that the “garden of uprooted annuals” has not materialized.

Conclusion: Stare Decisis – Not Quite What It Claims to Be
In a recent review of Neil Duxbury’s book, The Nature and Authority of
Precedent,157 Stephen Waddams cites Duxbury’s view that “the doctrine of
precedent has been an essential and beneficial part of the common law – but
paradoxically, that it has served the common law best by not being in practice quite what it claims to be in theory.”158 According to Duxbury,
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[t]he value of the doctrine of precedent rests not in its capacity
to commit decision-makers to a course of action but in its capacity simultaneously to create constraint and allow a degree of
discretion. A theory capable of demonstrating that judges can
never justifiably refuse to follow precedent would support a
doctrine of stare decisis ill-suited to the common law. For the
common law requires not an unassailable but a strong rebuttable presumption that earlier decisions be followed.159

Most commentators would agree that Canadian appellate courts have treated
the horizontal convention in this way for some time. Some would argue that
the presumption is not even that strong with respect to the horizontal convention in the Supreme Court of Canada. Certainly the vertical convention
remains stronger, even in the wake of the Bedford/Carter SCC approach
authorizing lower courts to revisit precedents in limited circumstances. It
is true that the judicial practice of stare decisis is not quite what the doctrine claims to be. However, this awareness should not be cause for alarm
or pining for a strict convention that invites formalism. The contemporary Canadian judicial practice of precedent is characterized by considerable
constraint while allowing a degree of discretion to respond to changing legal
norms or social context. In a case such as Carter SCC, that discretion can
(and did) make all the difference.
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